This article takes these insights seriously by analyzing legal reasoning and the institutions based on it in explicitly Type 1 terms. This marks a fundamental change from older approaches that try to construct jurisprudence exclusively from Type 2 logic. The shortcomings of the latter approach are particularly evident in the decades-long agenda to find an intellectually coherent middle ground between formalists who claim that legal texts are completely determinate, and realists who see judges as entirely unconstrained. While most lawyers agree that such a middle ground exists, we will see that formal philosophy-of-language accounts require ugly and ad hoc assumptions to explain it. This article argues that progress will be better served by acknowledging the existence of Type 1 processes and asking how they enter the law.
Similar changes are already underway in the humanities, where many scholars now stress that the subjective sense of beauty causes demonstrable changes in the brain. This immediately argues for theories that engage the "reading, aesthetics, and form" of texts at least as much as the postmodern fixation on politics and culture. 7 This article similarly seeks a biologically accurate understanding of how lawyers write and interpret texts. That said, law poses special problems. The reason is that a successful legal theory, unlike literature, should point to a single best interpretation. This requires that experts reach reliably similar judgments, at least on average, regardless of the culture they were born into. This kind of universality is natural in the sciences: Given that there can be only one truth in the physical world, humans' Type 1 intuitions must similarly converge or they would not be useful. We argue that lawyers who spend their lives drafting documents to constrain an uncertain future will develop similarly convergent intuitions in any society where lawyering exists as a discernible activity. The surprise is that the Type 1 emotion of beauty is similarly universal for entirely subjective choices. For example, psychologists have shown that artists in small Japanese villages reliably make the same aesthetic choices as American Ivy League experts. This implies that lawyers may have similarly aesthetic preferences for some doctrinal choices compared to others.
No matter what its origins, the existence of universality has important normative implications.
In particular, it argues that all lawyers share at least some common Type 1 beliefs. This A.Posner, How Judges Think (Harvard: 2008) at pp. 9 (arguing that judicial discretion judges "is a consequence of legalism's inability in many cases to decide the outcome (or decide it tolerably …), and the related difficulty, or impossibility, of verifying the correctness of the outcome, whether by its consequences or its logic."), 12 ("[L]egalist tools -including those most hallowed methods of reasoning by analogy and strictly interpreting statutes and constitutions -come up short: The first is empty and the second has, despite appearances, a large discretionary element.") and 47 ("Legalists acknowledge that their methods cannot close the deal every time…There are too many vague statutes and even vaguer constitutional provisions, statutory gaps and inconsistencies, professedly discretionary domains, obsolete and conflicting precedents, and factual aporias.").
breathes new life into the claim that cases can be decided according to standards that are safely divorced from personal bias and politics.
We proceed as follows. Section II reviews historic attempts to locate law within the more general problem of text interpretation. Section III reviews what scientists have learned about Type 1 thought processes, including mounting evidence that they provide a reliable guide to truth in such fields as visual art, literature, physics, and mathematics. We also describe evidence for a modest universality whereby experts from widely different cultural and educational backgrounds often reach the same aesthetic judgments. Section IV presents evidence for Type 1 reasoning in law and traces how it enters doctrine to decides cases. Section V reviews 19 th Century arguments that aesthetic judgments provide a reliable guide to law and updates them to accommodate the more modest versions of universality that science has documented. It also asks how the prevalence of Type 1 thought frames lawyers' everyday experience of practice. Section VI asks how legal institutions amplify universality's weak ex ante consensus to generate stable, predictable rules. Section VII extends these arguments to make policy recommendations. Section VIII provides a brief conclusion.
II. The Law-and-Literature Debate
Since the 1980s, legal scholars debating the determinacy of legal texts have almost always located their arguments within the broader problem of literary theory. The resulting law-andliterature movement is conventionally dated to Prof. Levinson's article arguing that humanities scholars could help lawyers establish a coherent "set of rules" for estimating the "hardness" of meaning against conflicting interpretations.
8 This was both natural -legal documents are plainly texts -and practical, since literary theory had long since moved beyond law's arid debate between legal realists who stress the "reality of disagreement among equally competent speakers of the native language" 9 on one side, and formalists "infatuate[ed] … with the possibility of a science of criticism" 10 on the other. Despite this, Levinson was not particularly hopeful, concluding with the gloomy assessment that attempts to find meaningful patterns in precedent remain "a supreme act of faith."
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Two years later Prof. Dworkin seconded Levinson' warned that these theories could also make law less determinate, creating "hard cases" that judges would have to decide "as a question of political theory," although he hoped that judges would choose these theories based on natural "fit" rather than personal politics. 13 At least in retrospect, Dworkin's decision to invoke the aesthetic concept of "fit" was an early hint that Type 1 reasoning could limit discretion.
At this point literary critic Stanley Fish entered the debate. Probably his most lasting contribution was to frame the problem in formally Type 2 terms as "…a few basic questions in the philosophy of language." 14 He then argued that an "interpretative community" could narrow the list of permissible interpretations. However, this did not really supply the middle ground that Levinson and Dworkin had wanted. On the one hand, it implied that an unelected elite would decide for everyone, a possibility that Levinson had rejected. 15 On the other hand, no one could say exactly how much narrowing would occur since this necessarily depended on who joined the community. This gap was particularly painful since the existence of just one conflicting interpretation could leave judges unconstrained.
Watching the argument play out, Judge Posner protested that the law/literature analogy had been misguided all along. Literature, he said, was aesthetic and profited from ambiguity. 15 Levinson, supra note 8 at p. 384 (While one can appeal to "Kuhnian communities" of shared conventions, we should be "acutely aware of the contingency of such conventions.") Fish himself seemed to welcome such power, arguing that literary theory "might play a role in altering the way in which the legal world is constructed by altering the way in which legal actors conceive of their activities." Fish, supra note 14 at p. 308. 16 Richard Posner, Law and Literature, supra note 6 at p. 240. 17 Id. at p. 242. Posner's specific ire was directed to a hypothetical argument that the Constitution did not literally require presidents to be 35 years old, but only have "… the maturity and station in life of an average 35 year old." Id.
Fish shot back that Posner's attempt to create a special subcategory for legal texts changed nothing: After all, philosophy-of-language arguments applied to all texts whatsover. 18 Formally, this bit of Type 2 logic was irreproachable. All the same, Posner had a point. While philosophyof-language arguments showed that variant interpretations were possible, they said nothing at all about which ones were likely. This created a deep conflict with the nearly universal perception that some legal and also literary interpretations are enormously better than others. 19 This suggested that merely "better" readings could meaningfully constrain judges even when tighter constraints were not feasible.
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Thirty years later, legal scholars continue to wrestle with essentially the same arguments. 21 In the meantime, literary theory has begun moving beyond narrow philosophy-of-language approaches to consider empirical evidence that humans' response to reading produces measurable changes in the brain. This suggests that texts matter, rebutting accusations that literature is merely the "…constructed handmaiden of sociopolitical power." 22 The point is even more promising for law, where it is reasonable to ask whether Type 1 insights might favor some interpretations compared to others. Remarkably, recent science strongly supports this conjecture.
III. The Science
Critics have cited the subjective emotion of beauty as evidence for an underlying unity in how humans understand painting, music, literature, and the other "sister arts" since the 18 th Century. This section reviews what scientists have learned about the nature of Type 1 judgments, focusing on the surprising result that artists from different societies often make the same aesthetic judgments, regardless of the cultures that they were born into. 31 Id. at p. 506 (the poetic imagination "differs in this respect from logic, that it is not subject to the controul of the active powers of the mind, and that its birth and recurrence have no necessary connection with the consciousness or will.") 32 Id. at p. 485 (aesthetics are defined "as existing in the mind of the creator, which is itself the image of all other minds.") 33 Carlos E. Perez, Artificial Intuition: The Improbable Deep Learning Revolution (2018) at p. 96. 34 Wikipedia, "Turing Machine," https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_machine. Turing's logic was nicely anticipated by the poet W.B. Yeats, who noticed after refusing a political debate "…that all the arguments which had occurred to me earlier were said by somebody or other. Logic is a machine; one can leave it to itself, and unhelped it will force those present to exhaust the subject. The fool is as likely as the sage to speak the appropriate answer to any assertion. If an argument is forgotten, someone will go home miserable. You throw your money on the 36 Remarkably, the dichotomy between logic and pattern recognition also applies to machines. Computers built around human-supplied Type 2 logic are wonderful at arithmetic but do a terrible job of recognizing patterns. Conversely, "neural network" architectures that learn by interacting with the environment have the opposite problem: They are good at recognizing patterns but incapable of long division. Carlos E. Perez, Artificial Intuition, supra note 33 at p. 96.
A. Type Intuition: Aesthetics, and Fast Thinking
Prof. Armstrong argues that Type 1 reasoning enters reading through the "recognition of patterns." This implies that readers move "both upward (by assembling details into overall patterns) and downward (by using the overall pattern to make sense of details)." 37 We argue in Section IV that legal reasoning similarly amounts to an extended exercise in finding and comparing patterns across different levels of text.
Brain Imaging. We have already said that the perception of beauty has been reported not just for art, but also for mathematics, physics, and a wide variety of practical tasks. networks learn by trial-and-error, constantly rewiring themselves to make pattern detection more efficient. But while they sometimes make predictions that no human can duplicate, their reasoning often cannot be articulated or even understood by us. Indeed, some make 43 Id. at p. 49 ("There is interesting experimental evidence that the making and breaking of neuronal connections stimulates the expression of neurotransmitters strongly associated with pleasure in ways that no doubt affect aesthetic experiences.") 44 Reading short stories activates the same regions that the reader would use if they were performing, imagining, or observing the protagonist's actions in real life. Crucially, the A and R cells exhibit "threshold," i.e. only fire when incoming signals exceed some predetermined value. The machine then evolves to maximize the probability that one and only one R cell will fire when the desired pattern appears. This is done by rewiring the connections between the A and R cells each time detection fails. Specifically, A cells that sent out a positive signal produce a higher output the next time, while A cells that sent out a negative signal have their strength reduced. This makes it more likely that the relevant R cell will guess right next time. Id. at pp. 220ff. The same basic architecture can also be modified to solve more abstract problems, for example creating categories that to parsimoniously distinguish different types of events. Id. at pp. 209-238.
predictions that no human can duplicate. 47 What makes this strange is that every neural network can be formally reduced to a set of linear algebra equations. Despite its formal clarity, the mathematics is much too complicated for our Type 2 selves to understand.
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B. Universality
Philosophy-of-language arguments have difficulty explaining why one interpretation should be better than any other. An improved theory must add assumptions that break this symmetry. Fish's suggestion of an elite interpretive community is one (unpalatable) way to do this. This article starts from different evidence showing that certain judgments are universal, i.e. that human experts often make the same Type 1 choices no matter what culture they were born into. Crucially, this universality implies that experts from any one country share common ground no matter how much they disagree about culture and politics.
Objective Problems. The idea that Type 1 perceptions in fields like physics or mathematics are universal seems entirely reasonable. We have already said that Type 1 methods are optimized to spot patterns. In fields where the physical world defines a single truth, any sense of beauty which reliably points to that truth must similarly converge on a unique pattern.
Aesthetic Convergence. The harder question is whether purely aesthetic responses can be similarly universal. Psychologists first proposed experiments to probe how humans make aesthetic judgments in the 1870s. 49 However early researchers soon found that average people do not share aesthetic judgments across cultures. 50 This slowed research until Prof. Irvin L. Child took a second look in the 1960s. 51 While Child confirmed that lay opinion does indeed depend on culture, this was not true for experts.
Child's method depended on asking native artists to compare similar paintings. In each case, American experts had overwhelmingly agreed that one design was aesthetically superior to the other. 52 In his most famous study, Child showed pairs of both abstract and representational paintings to thirty-six Japanese potters in small rural villages. They agreed with Ivy League American experts 63 percent of the time. Significantly, the odds of this happening by chance were less than one percent. 53 By comparison, the same Ivy League experts' chances of agreeing with a Connecticut high school student were just 47 percent -indistinguishable from a simple coin toss. 54 Child's universality only occurs in specific circumstances. First, it is limited to experts who have spent large parts of their lives making aesthetic choices. Second, the effect is modest, just ten percent more than a coin toss. This makes it nearly invisible in everyday life unless and until humans organize surveys to look for it. Third, Child's method uses similar images and therefore makes no claim to large choices, say that a Picasso is superior to an African folk mask.
Origins. It is natural to ask what causes universality. Given that the effect only applies to experts, learning must play a role. This immediately rules out explanations in which evolution has hardwired aesthetic preferences directly into the brain. Instead, Child argued that artists learn by contemplation, independently discovering "similar facts about the adequacy of particular works for satisfying aesthetic interests." 61 However, this still left the question of what generates these "aesthetic interests" to begin with. This was probably unanswerable in the 1960s. Today, however, we know that the brain's pleasure centers reward us for forming new neural connections and using old ones. 62 In this view, art is a form of play designed to question our established views of the world and try out new ones.
For now, at least Child's hypothesis is not the only possibility. Aesthetic convergence could also be driven by a self-selection effect in which certain personality types preferentially become potters. In principle this can be checked by testing how peoples' aesthetic responses change before and after they become experts, although little work has been done in this area. 60 The strategy is particularly temping in an era when computers make it easy to decompose images into mathematically precise "Fourier" and "Power Spectra" components. See e.g., Renoult, "The Evolution of Aesthetics," supra at p.282; Wilfried van Damme, "Universality and Cultural Particularity in Visual Aesthetics" pp. Child's universality research was limited to art. However anecdotal evidence suggests that the sense of beauty in physics similarly flows from prolonged contemplation without any need for special education or indoctrination. As the physicist P.A.M. Dirac remarked, people who study mathematics "usually have no trouble appreciating it."
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IV. Type 1 Thinking in Law
We have seen that Type 1 insights play a significant role in fields ranging from the visual arts to mathematics. However, the relative importance of Type 1 and Type 2 processes varies dramatically by discipline. This makes it natural to see law as an intermediate case along a continuum between art (principally Type 1) to science (mostly Type 2). This section collects invested orders of magnitude more time making aesthetic choices. Child and Schwartz, "Exposure to Better and Poorer Art, supra at n. 49. 64 Id. at p. 112. (school children who had been told which art experts preferred could be taught to distinguish "fairly well" which art was considered "better.") 65 Child found that students made "impressive" progress when he showed them seven principles, each illustrated with pairs that did and did not follow the suggested advice. Irvin L. Child and Rosaline S. Schwartz, "Exploring the Teaching of Art Values," The Journal of Aesthetic Education 1(2) (1966), pp. 41-54. Child's principles were: Selectivity, organization, consistency, variety, aliveness, use of decoration, and appropriate use of elements. Id. at 50-51. These cryptic labels were explained through detailed -but far from algorithmic -definitions which demand further judgment from the reader. For example, Child defined "Use of Decoration" as follows: "Good decoration must suit the object. It must not 'fight' with the object as a whole in line, color, textures, shapes, or forms. Good decoration must seem an essential part of the object or work of art and not look 'stuck on' as an afterthought. Good decoration does not ask attention for itself but permits the entire object or work of art to remain most important." Id. I cannot find a piece of mathematics beautiful unless I first understand it properly -and that means it can take a while for me to appreciate the aesthetic qualities. I don't think this unique to mathematics. There are pieces of music, buildings, pieces of visual art where I have not at first appreciated their beauty or elegance -and it is only by persevering, by grappling with the ideas, that I have come to perceive the beauty. For me, one of the joys of teaching undergraduates is watching them develop their own appreciation of the beauty of mathematics.
Vicky Neal, "Mathematics is Beautiful (No, Really)," supra note 24.
evidence for Type 1 reasoning in law and traces the specific mechanisms that let it decide particular cases.
67
A. The Subjective Experience of Law
Legal realism's most notorious failing is that it ignores how lawyers actually practice and experience law. 68 Yet this was historically the first and most important clue that common brain functions were at work in fields from painting to physics. We begin with lawyering's most basic and defining function: Writing.
Writing. Non-legal writing is already deeply entangled with Type 1 thought. This is evident from, among other things, the fact that finding the right words, is largely unconscious, brings pleasure, and is almost never reducible to Type 2 algorithms. That said, we seldom stop to realize just how much work Type 1 processes do. Consider this deceptively simple phrase: "A lovely little old rectangular green French silver whittling knife." Move a single word and you immediately see that something has gone badly wrong. 69 Yet no one ever taught you an explicit Type 2 rule, and figuring it out is tedious 70 -so tedious in fact that you begin to wonder how the mind manages to write whole chapters and books. Sometimes this processing is purely aesthetic. But it also extends to knowing one's audience and how best to communicate.
Legal Writing. It is difficult to generalize about how writing's Type 1 content changes when the focus shifts to law. On the one hand, legal documents can be highly algorithmic, most notably in architecting elaborately interlocking definitions and borrowed terms of art. At the same time, they also pose Type 1 problems that lay writing does not. The characteristic lawyer activity is 67 Brain imaging researchers have yet to investigate legal reasoning. However, the relevant techniques are being developed, most notably in experiments that image subjects' brains in real time as they proceed through short stories. Nicole K. Speer, Jeremy R. Reynolds, Khena M. Swallow, and Jeffrey M. Zacks, "Reading Stories Activates Neural Representations of Visual and Motor Experiences," Psychological Science 20(8): 989-999 (2009) The additional difficulty for law is that asking subjects to make aesthetic choices for concepts like "nonobviousness" requires so much education that they could be inadvertently socialized to give particular answers. One workaround would be to look for universality in self-contained documents like contracts. 68 As Prof. Solum remarks, "… from a perspective internal to the law, the claim that judging is politics all the way down seems absurd, because it fails to account for the phenomenology of judging. Judges, lawyers, and legal scholars do not experience legal decisionmaking as the exercise of discretion based on politics. This point is actually common ground between legal scholars as diverse as Professor Ronald Dworkin, who believed that there was a legally correct outcome in every dispute, and Professor Duncan Kennedy, who defends the view that law is deeply political." Lawrence B. Solum, Universality. We have argued that science intuitions converge because there is only one physical world. We cannot know whether there is similarly some uniquely best way to write legal documents. But if there is, there cannot be many, and we should expect practitioners to converge on similar lessons in any society where "lawyering" is a discernible activity. In the modern world this arguably includes every nation on earth.
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The deeper question is whether universality goes beyond these shared experiences. Child's work suggests that we should expect aesthetic intuition to operate even when the experience 71 Dworkin, supra note 12 at pp at pp. 158-162. 72 The depth of these professional instincts is most visible when lawyers collaborate with educated lay people. For the past few years I have worked with academic biologists to screen proposed experiments against so-called "Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications." Given that our opinions are preserved with an eye to publication, the overall purpose closely resembles a common law court. Yet my lay colleagues seldom see this. Some offer explanations that "prove too much" by facially invalidating large swathes of federal law, or else framing rules that would allow almost any future experiment to go forward. Others give opaque explanations that say almost nothing about what the panel would accept next time. And still others propose fact tests that would be difficult or impossible to implement in practice. My point is not that I handle these issues better than my colleagues, though I think I do. Rather, it is that they do not see these pitfalls in the first place.
of lawyering teaches no life lessons at all. The joy which many formalists take in verbal gymnastics points strongly in this direction.
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Normative Implications. The existence of universality across countries implies that lawyers within any one country share common ground about how to interpret legal documents. Furthermore, this ground must exist despite the deep conflicts over values and goals that all societies face. This makes any standards based on this common ground completely democratic, at least if we assume that laypeople would agree with the experts given sufficient time and study. This normative/democratic argument is sufficiently important that we should worry about possible loopholes. The first is empirical. Pending further research, universality could still turn out to be a selection effect, i.e. that legal careers attract people whose values are systematically different from average humans. In that case, agreed standards among lawyers would not represent the broader society after all. Second, assuming that universality is learned, its lessons cannot be broader than the experience of lawyering itself. This unavoidably includes a bias toward individuals' rights and goals. This could sometimes slant legal reasoning toward, say, capitalist values compared to socialist ones.
B. Mechanics: Finding Alternative Patterns.
We now ask how Type 1 intuition enters legal reasoning to decide cases. Unlike most of the existing literature 75 , we decline the (probably impossible) task of reducing legal judgment to completely determinate, Type 2 rules. This section emphasizes how legal research use Type 1 methods to find new patterns within legal texts.
Suppose that you represent a client, and that your opponent has cited some rule that establishes liability. In the physical world there can only be one truth, ensuring that every pattern must be consistent with every other pattern. Legal doctrine, on the other hand, is assembled piecemeal by many hands over time. This implies that patterns can and often will be inconsistent. The advocate's job is to find a pattern that favors her client and persuade a court that this version is the attractive one.
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There are basically three ways for legal researchers to develop patterns. First, the advocate can drill down into particular words and phrases, the same tactic that led Bill Clinton to argue, "It depends on what the meaning of the word 'is' is." 77 This is often fairly easy, since dictionaries invariably offer several synonyms for every definition, each of which recursively leads to still more definitions and synonyms.
Second, acts that are forbidden by one rule law may sometimes be authorized and even required by other bodies of law. Here the main difficulty is to find a second rule broad enough to cover the behavior at issue. 78 Sometimes this can be easy. For example, intellectual property gives recipients a "lawful monopoly," while antitrust law holds that some (poorly-specified) business methods for exploiting patents are illegal. The result is that there is no gray area: If you guess wrong you not only lose your intellectual property reward, you commit a felony. 80 "Statutes and constitutions are written in haste by busy people not always of great ability or diligence, and we are not privileged to ignore the hasty and hackneyed provisions and reserve our attention for the greatest. Moreover, they are products of a committee (the legislature) rather than of a single mind, and of a committee whose numerous members may have divergent objectives. To suppose that its every word probably has significance, that every statute is a seemless whole, misconceives the legislative process." Posner, supra note 6 at p. 
C. Legal Judgment: Choosing The Best Pattern
We have argued that advocates who look hard enough can usually find competing patterns. At this point, legal reasoning consists of picking the "best" or "most convincing" one. If law was a Type 2 activity good lawyers could stand at a white board and demonstrate the right choice to everyone. But of course, this is precisely what they cannot do. 85 Instead, the best they can do is point out qualitative reasons to choose their pattern in much the same way that art critics admire some works compared to others. 86 American lawyers typically refer to these characteristically Type 1 narratives as "judgment." A legal realist would presumably call this a smokescreen. However, our "green knife" example argues that Type 1 thought often processes enormous amounts of data. Anecdotally, at least, most working lawyers seem to think that judgment conveys valuable information.
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Education and Socialization. Law-and-literature theorists often invoke "education" and "socialization" to inject democratic values into Fish's otherwise elitist "interpretive community." By comparison, universality argues for a humbler role in which education mostly points students to truths they would eventually discover anyway. As The Paper Chase's Prof. Kingsfield says, "I call on you, ask you a question and you answer it. Why don't I just give you a lecture? Because through my questions, you learn to teach yourselves. Through this method of questioning and answering, questioning, answering, we seek to develop in you the ability to analyze that vast complex set of facts that constitutes the relationships of members within a given society. Questioning and answering. At times you may feel that you have found the correct answer. I assure you that this is a total delusion on your part. You will never find the correct, absolute and final answer."
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Conversely, universality should make us suspicious of more coercive approaches, for example the ferocity that first year law professors bring to instilling the doubtful 89 idea that contract law is unthinkable without "consideration." 90 Given how deeply the concept has embedded itself in Anglo-American law, there is probably no great harm in this. But we should worry that the same power could be used to instill political and cultural agendas, even if universalism starts to undo these lessons as soon as students start practicing law.
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V. Toward a Type 1 Theory of Law (A): Individuals
We have argued that Type 1 thought (a) is centrally important to legal reasoning, and (b) displays significant universality. The remainder of this article assumes these facts and traces their implications for lawyers and legal institutions. This Section reviews 19 th Century claims that what we now call Type 1 reasoning should guide policymakers, updates those theories to accommodate the modern evidence for universality, and asks how Type 1 thought shapes the subjective experience of lawyering. Section VI builds on these foundations by analyzing how judicial institutions amplify universality's comparatively weak signals to establish a rough approximation to formalism. The idea that Type 1 thinking should guide law is nearly as old as the concept of aesthetic/unconscious thought itself. The argument seems to have originated with Percy Shelley, who claimed in 1821 that "poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the World." 93 Logic, he argued, was not strong enough to find solutions to social issues -and particularly not the largest and most important ones. This implied that reason's role in public life, though useful, was mainly to "follow[] in the footsteps of poets, and copy the sketches of their creations into the book of common life."
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Shelley's ideas were only published in 1840, and even then were slow to diffuse. It took another three decades for poet and critic Matthew Arnold to state them definitively. For the most part, his Culture and Anarchy (1869) tracks Shelley's argument, albeit with new names so that "reason" is relabeled "science," and "imagination" becomes "culture." 95 However, Arnold also improved on Shelley by admitting that people could disagree about what was beautiful.
Building on his earlier work in literary theory, he argued that critics who repeatedly compared new art against recognized "great masters" would eventually reach a consensus. 96 This collective refinement was especially valuable in politics, where it would stop magnetic individuals from leading society astray the way that the French Revolution had.
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B. Updating The Theory
Most of Shelley and Arnold's logic is still viable today. Nevertheless, their argument had a significant defect: For aesthetic judgment to guide law, it must first point in some identifiable additional and more objective standard for lawyers. Second, Child compared Yale-trained experts to self-taught artists. The convergence would probably have been greater had the latter group been formally educated that way law students are.
direction. But where does this come from? For Shelley and Arnold, the answer was obvious: The criterion of beauty and the good society already existed in the mind of God.
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The question in the 21 st Century is whether Child's more limited and stochastic version of universality can fill this gap. As we argue below, legal institutions provide a natural mechanism for converting weak statistical preferences into quasi-determinate rules. The more serious objection is that Child's evidence is limited to choices between similar images. This suggests that a comparable universality in law probably does not hold for large choices, for example between the US Constitution and Taiwan's. That may explain why common law courts try to change as little doctrine as possible. This is partly due to economics: The amount of effort that advocates spend looking for new patterns is limited by litigation budgets on the one hand, and judges' reluctance to learn elaborate new legal theories on the other. However the principle is also codified in the legal doctrine of stare decisis. 99 Significantly, all of these factors are flexible, so that we should expect at least some evolution over time.
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C. The Subjective Experience of Law
Neural network theory teaches that judges' brains contain elaborate models of the world. Formally, these encode complex equations that assign weights to every possible variable. It follows that the advocate's job is to supply whatever combinations of data garner the biggest response given the judge's limited appetite for learning new patterns. If both advocates knew the judge's underlying equation exactly, one side would always win. But we have seen that, in practice, the full formula is too complicated for humans to understand. This ensures that the ideal argument is never presented, so that the weaker side occasionally prevails.
In fact, the situation is worse than that. Given that advocates often know very little about their judges, 101 the safest course will often be to assume universality 102 and write for an average audience. Even then, however, advocates need to worry that their own views might be eccentric. This explains why practicing lawyers endlessly repeat their arguments to colleagues, trying out new variants to find the most attractive ones.
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Grand Illusion. One of legal realism's biggest failings is that it says almost nothing about how lawyers actually practice. Watch oral argument in any courtroom and you will see advocates talk endlessly about "The Law" as if it existed outside themselves. This resembles nothing so much as the old claim that mathematics is never "created" but only "discovered." 104 Legal realists, of course, dismiss this as a smokescreen to hide judges' arbitrariness from a credulous public. But in that case, why do lawyers do the same thing in private when there is no public to play to? The better answer is that universality only exists as a statistical quantity -and a fairly weak one at that. On the one hand, every lawyer shares a small piece of it, enough to convince her that her instincts are far better than the average layman's. On the other hand, she also knows that her estimates are often wrong. The only way to be sure is to ask other lawyers. Law feels external because, in the deepest sense, it is.
VI. Towards an Type 1 Theory of Law: Institutions
Superficially, Child's sixty percent universality is only ten percent better than a simple coin toss. Whether this matters depends on institutions. For example, sixty percent agreement among voters would be a landslide in national politics. 105 The question for law is how complicated court systems amplify and occasionally garble the signal.
A. What Does "Rule of Law" Require?
We 110 Economists have modelled the situation in one of two ways. First, they consider trust games in which Alice helps Bob because she thinks he will return the favor. If Bob makes a reciprocal calculation, the assumptions become self-reinforcing even though neither is enforceable. The trust game dynamic is particularly visible when attorneys hire local co-counsel to avoid being "hometowned" in unfamiliar courthouses. Having a local counsel present turns what would otherwise be a dangerous one-time transaction into one more installment in the community's repeat interactions.
The second set of theories assumes that each actor inherently possesses a fixed amount of trustworthiness which, however, cannot be measured directly. Real life is bound to be messier. On the other hand, courts only write opinions when plaintiffs decide that bringing suit will be cost-effective. This suggests that bad theories can linger for years waiting for a plaintiff that is either sufficiently rich or sufficiently desperate to attempt a revival. 117 We should also expect strategic attempts to change the law through forum shopping and/or government and advocacy group campaigns that keep bringing cases until the law changes.
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VII Policy Implications
The age-old debate between the legal realists and formalists was never about policy. Indeed, the realists seldom claimed that formalism and rule of law were not desirable -only that they were illusory. Sentencing Guidelines, for example, might be the best choice after all. On the other hand, such well-defined problems tend to be rare in law. For closer cases, at least, judges lean toward Type 1 solutions when problems are sufficiently regular to be predictable and common to allow prolonged practice. 122 When Type 1 methods are desirable, the best way to implement them will be to adopt openended inquiries on the pattern of the "reasonable man" standard 123 in tort law or the various "balancing tests" beloved of constitutional lawyers. 124 The good news, as we have argued, is that universality will often make these standards more determinate than they seem.
Textualism vs. Intentionality. This article has so far focused on the global choice between Type 1 and Type 2 rules. But Type 1 thought is itself subdivided between aesthetic judgments and pattern recognition. This neatly overlaps the traditional division between "intentionalists," who focus on what the original drafters meant, and "textualists" who privilege how ordinary readers understand documents on average. 125 It is reasonable to think that readers' facilities for pattern recognition can be encouraged by, for example, doctrines that stress historic intent over the reader's own subjective reactions to text. But in that case, which choice should the legal system make? We have emphasized that universality depends partly on aesthetics and partly on pattern recognition, and these will often pull in opposite directions. To the extent that we value determinacy, we should choose whichever form of universality proves strongest.
B. Deciding Close Cases
Legal scholars have long known that establishing a coherent "middle ground" for interpreting precedent does not guarantee determinate rulemaking. Instead, there will always be "hard cases" where the better interpretation is unclear. 126 Following our universality discussion, this can happen for two reasons:
Reason 1. Even when most judges agree with one view on average, a few judges may see the choice as indeterminate. This group could well be different for every issue.
Reason 2. Child presented his subjects with pairs in which Ivy League experts overwhelmingly preferred one image to the other. But suppose he had instead selected images that were "close" in quality? Logically, we would expect this perception to be universal as well.
The problem, of course, is that judges who encounter close cases cannot be sure whether they are experiencing "Reason 1" or "Reason 2." From this standpoint, it is probably better for each judge to give her best estimate for the correct outcome even in close cases, so that universality emerges for Reason 1 cases in the usual way. This still leaves the question of what to do about Reason 2 cases. Here some individual human -preferably the appellate courts -will have to decide. At the same time, democratic theory suggests that Reason 1 cases should be decided through universality. This means that appellate judges should normally defer to the lower courts once a clear majority emerges.
C. Guarding Against Prejudice.
The problem with Type 1 judgments is that they are unconscious. This means that we can never be sure when prejudice enters in. Here universality is a partial corrective since purely personal biases will often cancel each other on average. The larger question is what to do when the prejudices are themselves universal. For example, all humans prefer certain faces to others.
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This makes reasonable to worry that judges might sometimes rule for the prettiest litigant.
Here the most obvious response is to identify and correct biases using explicitly Type 2 statistical reasoning. The deeper problem is that our logical selves may not understand the patterns that machines find in our Type 1 reasoning. The question will then become whether we trust our machines enough to take corrective action on faith.
Conclusion
This article has argued that legal reasoning cannot be analyzed in exclusively logical, Type 2 terms. Instead, Type 1 intuitions play a crucial role in deciding how law evolves. Acknowledging this reality will force policymakers to confront significant new issues, most obviously whether legal doctrine should encourage Type 1 or Type 2 processes in specific cases.
The surprise is universality, i.e. the tendency of lawyers to reach similar judgments no matter what culture they were born into. This provides a natural explanation for the common perception that judges feel significantly constrained by a middle ground that is neither "formalist" not "legalist." This is particularly attractive since universality seems to originate from shared truths that most practicing lawyers will eventually come to. Apparently, law is more than identity politics after all.
The Victorian vision that aesthetic insights will lead society to the mind of God are gone forever. But we can still hope to build common law systems that are impartial, predictable, and stable against unconscious bias. Compared to the claims of its predecessors, this new formalism is modest, imperfect, and stochastic. No matter. It will do.
